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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
l.(lB~~E NI1:LN(>N, 
[>faiutiff, ... lj)JJrllanf and 
I l ( 's 1 H u 1 de 11 f on ( 1 r n s s .A p peal, 
' 
-vs.- \ 
1~~.\RL I_.AE R(>Y IIlTT(~HINGS, ' 
/J(feudauf, Respondeut allrl 
(
1 ross .A.1) }Jf'!l a 111. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND 
CROSS APPELLANT 
ST""\TEl\fE~T OF NATURE OF C~-\Sr: 
This appeal involves an automobile-pedestrian acci-
dent " .. herein plaintiff-pedestrian seeks to recover dam-
<lg'l)s for injuries sustained by her, "Then struck by an 
automobil0 driven by defendant. The questions on ap-
peal relate to the propriety of the trial judge in hi~ 
refn~al to give certain instructions to the jury and in 
granting defendant judgment notwithstanding a Jury 
YPrdict in favor of plaintiff. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This personal injury case was tried to a jury in the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable :1\Ierrill C. Faux presiding. In defendant 'R 
requested instruction No. 4 the trial judge was requested 
to instruct the jury that plaintiff was negligent as a 
matter of law and that the jury should determine wheth-
er such negligence was a contributing proximate cause 
of the accident and plaintiff's injuries. The trial judge 
refused to do so and the jury returned a Yerdict in 
favor of plaintiff and against the defendant for the 
sum of $3,550.00. After entry of the jury verdict, de-
fendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict was granted. Plaintiff prosecutes this appeal from 
the trial court's granting of defendant's motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict and defendant prose-
cutes his cross appeal from the trial court's failure to in-
struct the jury on negligence and proximate cause as he 
requested. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The relief sought by defendant on this appeal is as 
follows: 
1. Order affirming the Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict entered by the lo,ver Court. 
2. In the alternative on the cross appeal an Order 
remanding the case to the trial court for re-trial, order-
ing the lo,ver court to instruct the jury as requested hy 
defendant on his Requested Instruction ~o. 4. 
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Tl1P aeridl'llt out of 'vhirh this action arose occurred 
at approximatPly 7 :~0 p.m. (R 83) on June 28, 1962, at 
thP inter!-'P<'t ion of Sixth South Street and Second East 
~trPrt in ~alt Lake City, Utah (R 83, 100). Sixth ~outh 
~t rprt runs east and west (R 84) and Second East runs 
north and south (R 8.) ). At the time of the accident 
Sixth South \\'as approximately 90 feet wide 'vith an in-
t Prmittant 'vhitP renter line. (R 83) The street had no 
other traffic lane markings but it "·as \vide enough for 
t\\·o lanes of traffic in each direction (R. 85). The north 
half of Sixth South just west of its intersection \vith 
Second East \vas 45 feet 9 inches wide (R 85). 
Second East Street \Vas approximately 90 feet ,,~ide 
(R 85). South of the intersection it was marked \vith 
t\\·o lanes for southbound traffic, two lanes for north-
bound traffic plus a left turn storage lane for automo-
biles tra ,·elling from Second East left onto Sixth South 
(R·. 1~2, 128). The east half of Second East Street was 
approximately 45 feet wide with the outside northbound 
lane being 21 feet wide, the inside northbound lane being 
14 feet wide and the left turn storage lane being 9 feet 
8 inches \vide. The west half of Second East Street ""'as 
approximately 44 feet wide, each lane being about 22 
feet "~ide ( R 178). There 'vas a painted crosswalk across 
Second East and Sixth South on each side of the inter-
section (R 94). The crosswalk on Sixth South \Vest of 
the intersection \vas 7 feet 5 inches \vide (R 85) and 
from the east line of this crosswalk to the west curb 
line on Second East Street was 14 feet 3 inches 
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(R 87). A semaphore suspended at the center of the 
intersection controlled the movement of traffic in each 
direction (R 101). 
On the day of the accident defendant 'vas driving 
his automobile north on Second East Street in the inside 
lane. There 'vere no cars in front of him ( R 91, 169). 
When he arrived at the intersection of Second Ea~t 
Street and Sixth South Street the semaphore 'vas red for 
traffic moving on Second East so he signaled his inten-
tion to turn left onto Sixth South Street (R 91, 170), 
pulled into the left turn storage lane and stopped in obe-
diance to the red light (R. 91, 170). When the light turned 
green for him he negotiated his left turn west onto Sixth 
South Street at a speed of approximately 5-10 miles per 
hour (R 173). As he got into his turn so that he was fac-
ing in a westerly direction the sun struck him in the eyPs 
and he reached up to pull down his sun visor. Just as he 
did so, his wife, 'vho 'vas 'vith him in the car, shouted for 
him to stop. He applied the brakes and immediately 
thereafter struck plaintiff with his automobile (R. 91). 
Just prior to the accident plaintiff ""'as 'valking 
south on the west side of Second East Street (R 101) and 
when she got to the intersection the light was green for 
traffic moving on Second East. Not knowing ho"' .. long it 
had been green she "'"aited '"'hile the semaphore complet-
ed its green cycle and waited through the red exposure 
so she could proceed when it turned green again (R 104). 
Before proceeding south across Sixth South on the "rest 
cross,:valk, plaintiff made an observation for traffic to 
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tht• cast, \\·Pst, behind her to the north and to the south 
(H 10~). ShP ohsPrved no automobiles coming from any 
<lirection PX<'Ppt OllP car "·hich 'vas coming from the Routh 
on Httt•onu East. '11his vehicle "·as stopped at the inter-
sP('tion in obedience to the semaphore but plaintiff ob-
st • rvPd no left turn signal being given ( R 102), and can-
Hot say \\·hether or not a signal 'vas being given (R 10;)). 
\\'"hen the light changed green for traffic on Second East 
plaintiff made an observation for traffic. on the road-
war in t\ach direction again, and saw none except the 
n utomobile across the intersection from her on Second 
Bast. She sa'v the automobile start into the intersec-
tion (R 128) and she then began to "·alk at a normal 
gait in the cross"·alk south across Sixth South. .As 
plaintiff proceeded across the street 'vith the sun to 
hPr back (R 133) she was looking "mostly" in front of 
her and to the southeast (R 130). 
Plaintiff looked to the "rest to make sure no cars 
"·ere coming from that direction (R 132) but did not 
look to the south (R 132) and did not see the automo-
bile being driven hy l\Ir. Hutchings, either directly or 
through her peripheral vision (R 132). She never did 
~ee the car from her first observation of it until just "a 
fraction of a second'' before the impact (R 130) dur-
ing "·hich time she "'"alked approximately 40 feet across 
the street. The impact on the car occurred on the right-
hand ~ide of the front bumper of the automobile below the 
light and 'vas merely a brushing off of the foreign ma-
terial and dust and dirt from the surface of the bumper 
(R 88). 
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The collision probably occurred in the \\·est cross-
'valk on Sixth South, 39 feet 6 inches south of the north 
curb line of Sixth South a.nd 17 feet 11 inches 'vest of the 
west curb line of Second East (R 87). 
Both streets are straight and level (R 97) and at 
the time of the accident the road surfaces \\·ere dry, the 
'veather clear (R 89) and there were no obstructions to 
the vision of either party (R 90). The sun \\~as lo'v in the 
western sky, making it bright and "quite glary" outside 
(R 126). 
At the time of the accident there \vas no other ve-
hicular traffic on Sixth South or Second East other than 
defendant's car; there was no other pedestrian traffic nor 
'vere there any holes, obstructions or detours in the 
crosswalk in which plaintiff was walking. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT C011j\1IT 
ERROR ON RULING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS 
GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
AS A MATTER OF LAW AND GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDG~IEKT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE JURY VERDICT. 
In considering matters on appeal, appellate courts 
a bide by certain rules \\7 hich have been laid do,vn dealing 
\\Ti th the scope of review in rna tters before them. One of 
these rules is to the effect that the judgment and proceed-
ings in the lo\\·er court are presumptively correct and 
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thP hurdPn is upon the losing party to sho,,· error. CooJnbs 
, .. ['t'rry, ~ lTtah ~d 381, 27j P. 2d 680 (1D:>4), Burton v. 
Z. (J . .11. 1., 1~~ Utah 360, 249 P. 2d il14. Another is that 
wPre a. trial judge has passed upon a question and has 
made a finding-, \Yhile such is not controlling, it is at least 
t'ntitled to some consideration and should not be "?holly 
ignor(\d in revie\\·ing the situation and attempting to see, 
us objert.iV'ely as pos~ible, \\·hether reasonable minds 
might differ. Toon1er's Estatr Y. Union Pacific Railroad 
OoniJJa.ny, 121 Utah :~7, 239 P. 2d 163. In discussing this 
problem in Kulbacki , .. Sobchrusky, 38 N. J. 435, 185 i\. 
2tl R:~.) ( 1962) the Supreme Court of N e'v Jersey said: 
\ Yhn t the trial judge must do is canvas the record, 
not to balance the persuasiveness of the evidence 
on the one side as against the other, but to deter-
mine \\·hether reasonable minds might accept the 
e\"irlence as adequate to support the jur:· Yerdict. 
1\nd in Hartpcnce v. Grauleff, 15 N.J. 545, 105 A. 2d 514, 
the same court in discussing the same problem declared: 
.. \ trial judge is in a better position than an appel-
late court to decide \Yhether justice has been done 
under the particular circumstances and the ''?eight 
of the credible evidence. He sees und hears the 
w·i tnesses, observes their demeanor and reactions, 
none of ""'hich has life in the record on appeal. He 
is in a position to know and equate all the factors, 
including any error he may have made, and estab-
lish a basis "·hic.h leads to the conclusion that the 
Yerdict 'Yas the result of passion, mistake or preju-
dice. His action should not be disturbed unless it 
rlearly and unequiYocably appears there "?as a 
manifest denial of justice under the la"'"· 
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In the instant case, after canYassing the record and 
after seeing and hearing the witnesses and observing 
their demeanor the lower court held that plaintiff wa~ 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of la\Y ,,~hich 
contributed to the accident and her injuries. The guide-
lines set up for the scope of review on appeal should lw 
applied here and the action of the lo\Yer eourt presumed 
to be correct and it should not be disturbed unless clearly 
and unequivocably shown by appeallant that the lo,ver 
court's action \Yas error and that there ,v·as a manifest 
denial of justice under the la"T· 
Contributory negligence is conduct for which plain-
tiff is responsible amounting to a breach of the duty 
which the law imposes on persons to protect themselves 
from injury, and which, concurring and cooperating 
with actionable negligence for which the defendant is 
responsible, contributed to the injury complained of as 
a proximate cause. 65 CJS, Negligence § 116; 10 B. 
Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, 
Perm Ed. § 6618, p. 3. A case should not be submitted 
to the jury where the facts pertaining to an issue are 
neither contradicted nor permissiYe of conflicting infer-
ences but are clearly settled and permit only a single 
inference. 65 C.J.S., Negligence, § 251. 
Ordinarily, questions of negligence and contributory 
negligence are for the jury, but a pedestrian who has 
failed to exercise ordinary care for his own safety and 
is injured by an automobile is guilty of contributory neg-
ligence as a matter of law. Clark v. Sn1itson, 346 S.\Y. 
2d 780 (l{entucky). 
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.\mong the cases in \rhieh the question of the negli-
gence of a pPdestrian in safeguarding himself from the 
movPments of motorists has been decided as a matter 
of la ". a rP the follo,,·ing: 
Good , .. Behreudt, 321 Ill. App. 303, 52 X.E. 2d 826, 
whPrP the pedestrian failed to look again after seeing 
the auto1nobile. C'ioffari v. Blanchard, 320 l\fich. 518, 47 
N. \r. 2d 718, \vhere the pedestrian failed to continue to 
look. lVinklc r v. 1ll oore, 312 l{y. 235, 227 S.W. 2d 187, 
"·here the pedestrian apparently walked into the side of 
the automobile. 
In Steu:art Y. Olson, 188 Wis. 487, 206 N."\'{. 909, 44 
.. \LR 1 ~~l:!, a pedestrian who saw an automobile coming 
along the same street in which he was running, and \Yho 
'vas struck \Vhen it turned onto a street which he \\.,.as 
crossing, and who could have stopped before he reached 
the place of danger, was held negligent as a matter of 
la\\T: he having testified that he thought the ear might 
turn into the cross street. 
See also Herter v. Herschfield, 205 Cal. 625, 271 P. 
1051. 
"\Vhile the law does not view a pedestrian as con-
tributorily negligent because he as not looked a certain 
number of times before crossing a street or high\Yay, 
Pueblo Transportation Compa;n.y v. Maylan, 123 Colo. 
207, ~~6 P. 2d 806: Reiler v. Hart, 202 Minn. 154, 227 
N.W. 405, yet a pedestrian crossing a street must not 
only look before he enters but must continue to look as 
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he proceeds and he will not be heard to say that he lookPJ 
without seing what was approaching and plainly visiblP. 
Ruchewski v. Wisswessu, 355 Pa. 400, 50 A. 2d 291. And 
even though there is an ordinance or statute giving the 
pedestrian the right of way at street crossings, such stat-
utes and ordinances create a preferential but not an ab-
solute right in their favor, Charvoz v. Cottrell, 12 Utah 2d 
25, 361 P. 2d 516; Switzer v. Baker, 178 Iowa 1063, 160 
N.W. 372; Harwitz v. Eurove, 129 Ohio St. 8, 193 N.E. 
644, 96 ALR 782, and it is still the pedestrian's duty to 
make diligent use of available means to avoid a known 
or apprehended danger, or one that under the circum-
stances he should have apprehended. Ordeman v. TV at-
kins, 114 Or. 581, 236 P. 488. See also the Annotation in 
164 ALR 117-124. 
A pedestrian intending to cross a traveled street not 
only has the duty to maintain a diligent lookout for ap-
proaching cars and to take notice of the condition of 
traffic, but as the operators of motor vehicles must do, 
the pedestrian is bound to make his observations at such 
times and places that his lookout will be effective. Peter-
son. v. Schneider, 153 Neb. 815, 46 N.W. 2d 355; Flanagan 
v. Slattery, 74 S.D. 92,49 N.W. 2d 57. 
A pedestrian is not required to keep looking right 
and left as he crosses the street but is required to exer-
cise reasonable care while crossing the street in a marked 
crosswalk and to continue to be alert and to safeguard 
against injury, throughout his passage. Figlia v. lVisner, 
150 Cal. App. 2d 109, 309 P. 2d 832. 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
()nt' ahout to (•ross a high\\·ay on "·hich motor Ye-
hi('ular truflic is to be expected must make reasonable 
ohsl'rva.tions to learn traffic conditions confronting him, 
look to the vieinity from which, \\yere a vehicle approach-
ing, it \vould be an immediate danger to his passage, try 
to make a sensible decision as to safety and generally 
l'XPrcist.~ ordinary eare, including reasonable use of his 
senses to avoid the accident. Christensen v. Berguzann, 
148 Cal. App. 2d 176, 306 P. 2d 561. 
The rights of pedestrians in Utah to the use of the 
public streets are the same as those of motorists, and 
henee, the same general duties devolve upon both of 
them. In the case of Hickok v. Skinner, 113 Utah 1, 190 
P. ~d 314 the Supreme Court held that a motorist \\~ho 
has the right of way across an intersection had a duty to 
observe for traffic as he proceeded across the intersec-
tion. Inherent in the duty of continuing observation is, 
of course, the duty to continually re-appraise the si tua-
tion and to take \\"hatever action is necessary, reasonable 
and prudent to protect oneself and others from harm, 
injury or danger based upon the change in circumstances, 
situations and conditions brought to the attention, by 
continuing re-appraisal, of the person crossing the street. 
Several cases involving automobile-pedestrian acci-
dents have been decided in this State by the Supreme 
Court. .L~lthough no case is exactly the same on its facts, 
a few are similar though distinguishable from the in-
~tant case. Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P. 2d 
680 (1954) 'vas an action by a pedestrian against the 
driver of an automobile for personal injuries sustained 
11 
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when struck by the automobile in a mid-block cross,valk. 
In that case, plaintiff and a friend were walking south-
ward on the east side of Washington Boulevard, Ogden 'H 
main street, between 26th and 27th Streets, in the evening 
about twilight. As they reached the mid-block cross-
walk, plaintiff looked north and saw a bus about one and 
one-half blocks away and she decided to cross the street 
to see if it was her bus. She walked west to the middle 
of the street, stopped and looked north and seeing no 
vehicles between herself and the corner, she took a few 
steps westward when she suddenly became a'vare of 
headlights to the north and was suddenly thereafter 
struck by defendant's automobile. 
Plaintiff's friend, who waited on the east side of 
the street, testified that she did not observe any automo-
bile between plaintiff and the corner. There was also tes-
timony from an independent witness that defendant was 
cutting across from the outside southbound lane to the 
inside southbound lane, to where plaintiff was, as he pro-
ceeded along Washington Boulevard. 
The Trial Court entered judgment for the pedes-
trian upon a jury verdict. Upon defendant's appeal the 
Supreme Court held that the questions of the driver's 
negligence and the pedestrian's contributory negligence 
were for the jury. 
It should be noted In the Coonzbs case that (1) 
neither plaintiff nor her friend sa'v defendant's car, (2) 
defendant traveled east on 26th Street and turned south 
onto Washington Boulevard about one-half block north 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of plaintiff, (:;) there "·as a eonflict in the testimony as 
to \Vhct hPr t hert' \vere any other cars on the street near 
dPfendaut 's ear, ( -l) there \Vas a conflict in the testimony 
as to \\'hat lane defendant \Vas traveling in and whether 
he \\'HS (•utting aeross to the inside lane and, ( 3) there 
was a confliet as to "·here the impact occurred on the 
autornobile. Such conflicts alone are sufficient reason 
to g-i Ye the matter to the jury for decision. X o such 
conflicts in testimony exist in the case on appeal herein. 
In the instant case there is not even a question as to 
\rhether defendant signaled for a left turn because he 
emphatically testified that he did so, and plaintiff testi-
fied only that she did not observe a signal and that she 
couldn ,t say "Thether one was given or not. 
In Coon1bs v. Pc,rry, the Supreme Court held that 
the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence "Tas 
one for the jury because the evidence \vas susceptible of 
many findings, viz. (1) that defendant's automobile was 
not on '': ashington Boulevard "Then plaintiff looked to 
the north, (2) that defendant was so far a\vay from plain-
tiff "·hpn she looked that had she seen him she could 
have a~sumed that he would stop because at the speed 
he \\Ta~ traveling he could have stopped his car several 
times over before reaching the spot w·here she \vas and 
at the speed defendant 'vas traveling when she realized 
that he \\Tasn 't going to stop it was too late, (3) inas-
much as plaintiff's friend looked and didn't see defend-
ant's car the jury eould have found that a reasonably 
prudent and careful person in plaintiff's position may 
also haYe looked and failed to haYe seen, ( 4) there is a 
13 
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possibility that since plaintiff became aware of defend-
ant's automobile all of a sudden that he may have been 
driving without hi§ lights on until he reached plaintiff, 
and ( 5) plaintiff could have looked and seen defend-
ant and assumed he would stay in the outside lane of 
travel where the jury could have found he was traveling. 
Mr. Justice Henriod in his dissenting opinion, ho\\?-
ever, thought that there was no question but that plain-
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
of law. 2 Utah 2d 381, 390-391. 
In deciding the Coombs case the Court had the fol-
lowing things to say about its reasons for disposing of 
the case as it did : 
The salient point is that the plaintiff as a pedes-
trian in a marked crosswalk, had the right of W"ay. 
The right of way rule simply means this: that if 
t'vo persons are so proceeding that if they con-
tinued their course there would be danger of col-
lision, the disfavored one (defendant) must giYe 
way, and the favored one (plaintiff) may proceed; 
and the favored one (plaintiff) may assume that 
this will be done. It is, of course, recognized that 
the right of way rule \vould not apply if, "Then the 
favored one (plaintiff) approached the crossing 
point (emphasis added) the disfavored one (de-
fendant) was so close that in due care he could 
not, or should not reasonably be expected to give 
way. pp. 387-388. 
Discussing this aspect of the case further at page 388 
the Court went on to say : 
In determining whether it must be ruled as a mat-
ter of law that plaintiff herself "?as negligent 
14 
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"·hich contributPd to rnuse hPr injury, considera-
tion must he give11, not only the fact that she had 
the right of "·ay upon "~hirh she could place some 
reliance, hut also that a pedestrian crossing a busy 
strPPt must be constantly vigilant for her O\vn 
safety "·ith respect to all of the conditions around 
her. 
Going further the Court declared: 
~ven if a car is seen approaching, unless it is so 
positioned as to constitute an immediate hazard 
to her, she is not necessarily obliged to focus full 
and undivided attention on that particular car and 
so calculate her entire conduct as to avoid being 
struck by it. She need not anticipate that the 
driYer will speed, fail to observe, or to control his 
c.ar, or fail to afford her the right of ''"·ay, or oth-
erwise be negligent unless indue ca,re she obserres 
or should observe something to 1rarn her of such 
iniJJroper conduct (Emphasis added) . 
. .:\ ncl in summing up on the lookout and right of \Yay ques-
tions the Court said at page 388 : 
This is not to say that a pedestrian may claim the 
right of \Yay in face of danger. She must, of 
course, be \Va tc hing for automobiles or other ve-
hicles on the street, particularly from the north 
"·here traffic \Yas most likely to come. But due 
care requires that she also keep a lookout ahead 
for other pedestrians, possible holes or o bstruc-
tions in the street and at least remain a\\·are of 
the possibility of other traffic, lest she be guilty of 
failing to use reasonable care for her O\Yn safety 
in regard to other dangers. 
Upon all the eYidence produced at the trial of the 
matter and upon the record before it the Supreme Court 
15 
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then gave its reason for holding that the contributory 
negligence of plaintiff vlas a question for the jury: 
Under the evidence here the jury may well have 
found that when plaintiff looked to the north there 
\Y·as no car approaching \Yithin a distance of im-
mediate hazard to her, and in view of the consid-
erations above discussed as to her right of \Ya~? 
and the necessity of remaining aw'are of other 
conditions around her, that her conduct in plac-
ing some reliance upon the observation she made 
and proceeding westward across the street \Yas 
consistent \vith her duty of ordinary and reason-
able care for her safety. 
Respondent herein earnestly urges the Court that 
the Coombs case and the case on appeal herein are dis-
tinguishable on their facts and the factual circumstances 
and conditions demanding the negligence of plaintiff 
be submitted to the jury in the former case are not 
present in the latter case and that the facts as revealed 
by the record on appeal require that plaintiff be found 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of la\Y. 
In Coo~n~bs v. Perry the essential factf.; are a~ fol-
lows: 
(1) The accident happened at dusk or t\vilight 
making it difficult to see. 
( 2) It \Yas dark enough for cars to be using 
their headlights. 
(3) Conflicting testimony as to defendant's posi-
tion on the road and the point of impact on the 
Ychiclc. 
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( 4) ( >t hers failPd to st)t) defendant's rar besides 
plaintiff. 
( .->) Plaintiff's attention may have been directed 
to other conditions and hazards on the road"~ay 
and in the crosswalk. 
(6) Defendant was traveling about ten times as 
fast as plaintiff "·as \valking so that it \Vas more 
difficult to extricate herself from the position of 
peril. 
(7) Plaintiff had to make her observations as to 
hazards over an area. of 90°, i.e., from due west, 
directly ahead of her, to due north, directly over 
her right shoulder, the direction from which de-
fendant was coming. 
In the case on appeal herein the essential facts are 
as follo,vs : 
(1) The accident occurred in the daytime when 
it was not difficult for plaintiff to see because she 
had her back to the sun, but \Yhen it \vas difficult 
for defendant to see because he \Vas coming di-
rectly into the sun. 
(:~) Plaintiff observed defendant's automobile but 
failed to observe the left turn signal being given 
by him. 
(3) Because of the direction that plaintiff was 
\valking and by reason the direction from \Yhich 
defendant \Vas coming, plaintiff merely had to 
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hold her head erect and look where she "·as going 
and she ,, .. ould have seen tlefendant 's automobile 
approaching her. 
( 4) There 'vas no other vehicular traffic on the 
roadway "'"ith the exception of defendant's auto-
mobile and since plaintiff had a red semaphore 
protecting her from east-west traffic on Sixth 
South she did not need to anticipate that traffic 
would come from either of those directions and 
harm her. 
( 5) Plaintiff did not need to concern herself about 
traffic turning right from Second East onto Sixth 
South because she had passed the point "?here 
such cars could be expected to traYel on the road-
"\vay before the accident occurred. 
(6) There "\vere no other hazards or objects that 
plaintiff needed to give her attention to because 
(a) there "\vere no other pedestrians in the cross-
"\Yalk she was occupying, (b) there were no ob-
structions in the crosswalk, (c) there "\vere no 
holes in the pavement. 
(7) Defendant's automobile 'vas the only object 
on fhe road that created a hazard for plaintiff and 
the direction from 'vhich it came and the only di-
reetion from "\vhich a hazard could come "Tas the 
only direction to 'vhich she did not give her 
attention. 
(8) Defendant's car "\vhich "\vas traveling about 
three times as fast as plaintiff "\\'"as "\valking creat-
18 
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l'<l an immediate hazard to plaintiff as she ap-
proathed the crossing point. 
(9) ]1 laiutiff 'valked approximately 40 feet with-
out ever having seen defendant's car as it ap-
proached her 'vithout slowing down. 
Had plaintiff been in the exercise of due care for 
her O\Vll safety as she crossed the street she could have 
~(len or Hhould have seen that defendant was not decreas-
ing his speed of travel and that he was reaching for the 
sun visor in his car as he approached her. This would 
haY(l put her on notice that defendant was unaware of 
her presence and she should take the simple precaution 
for her o'vn safety of merely slowing her gait or even 
stopping \vhile determining whether defendant was going 
to yield her the right of way. 
If it is true that plaintiff had the right of \Yay \\"hich 
she could rely on and \\"hich she could assume that de-
fendant would give her until in the exercise of due rare 
shP observed something to warn her to the contrary, 
defendant asserts that no individual can be put on no-
tice by observing some action to the contrary unless 
sneh individual is making an observation and is in fact 
~eeing """hat is there to be seen. Plaintiff was not in the 
exercisr of due care because no action taken by defend-
ant or failed to be taken by him could have put plaintiff 
on notice that an accident was imminent because plaintiff 
was not "yatching for the dangers around her or at least 
not 'vatching for any from the only direction that danger 
\Yould conceivably come. 
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Based on this discussion defendant asserts that 
Coontbs "· Perry and the instant case are different on 
their facts and if from all the facts and circumstances 
therein, the Coombs case presented a question for the 
jury on plaintiff's contributory negligence, on the same 
basis the case on appeal herein does not. 
Mingus Y. Olsson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P. 2d (1949) 
involved an automobile-pedestrian accident \vherein the 
pedestrian was struck by defendant's automobile and 
killed. At the trial the lo\ver Court granted defendant a 
directed verdict on the ground that the decedent pede~­
trian \Yas negligent as a matter of la\v. The case was 
affirmed on appeal. On February 23, 1945, at about 8:15 
p.m. the decedent and his "rife attempted to cross Thir-
teenth East Street in an unmarked crossVt~alk at its inter-
section \Yith Westminister Avenue in Salt Lake City. 
As they stepped from the curb and started easterly 
across Thirteenth East the decedent neither looked to 
his left nor right, but looked straight ahead as he pro-
ceeded across the street. He said nothing to her a bout 
approaching traffic; she did not see or hear defendant's 
automobile until it struck. The pedestrians proceeded 
about ten feet across the street "~hen they \Yere hit. 
The cross \Yalk did not run due east and \Vest but 
slightly southeasterly and north\vesterly, so that if the 
deceased \vere walking \vithin and parallel to the un-
marked lines of the cross\\Talk, and \Vas facing straight 
ahead in his course, his face \vould be turned slightly 
a\vay and his back slightly to\vard the traffic approach-
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1ng from the north. Deftlndant 's automobile coming 
from tltP north on Thirteenth East collided 'vith the 
pPdPstrians. 
Utah·~ ~upreme l~ourt held that decedent \vas 
.~nilt y of negligence as a matter of law for his failure 
to observe for vehicular traffic before undertaking to 
<'ross a road\Yay. Relating to the lookout question the 
t 1<>Hrt said : 
Jf ore <·on ,·incing that direct testimony that de-
ceased did not look, is the further evidence that 
deceased neither said nor did anything to indi-
cate that he "·as a,,~are of the danger presented 
by defendant's approaching automobile. He seems 
to haYe been "~holly unaware of its approach. 
Certainly he did nothing to u:arn his 'lrife, nor to 
rescue either hiJnself or her jro1n their position. of 
}Jeri! (Emphasis added). On this evidence, it must 
he said as a matter of la'v that deceased either 
failed to look, or having looked, failed to see \vhat 
he should ha Ye seen. 201 P. 2d 495, 498. 
Discussing the matter further at page 498-499 the Court 
~aid: 
'rhere can be no doubt that a padestrian 'vho un-
dertakes to cross a busy street in a large city, 
"~ithout first obserYing for vehicular traffic is 
g-uilty of contributory negligence. And this is 
true, even though he may be crossing in a cross-
,v·alk and haYe the right of way ...... A. pedestrian 
crossing a public street in a cross\\~alk or pedes-
trian lane, although he may have the right of \vay 
over vehicular traffic, nonetheless has the duty to 
obserYe for such traffic .... Of course \Ye do not 
mean to imply that a mere glance in the direction 
of the approaching automobile \vould suffice. The 
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duty to look has inherence in it the duty to S<-\P 
"\Yhat is there to be seen, and to pay heed to it. 
At page 499, Justice vVade, concurring, had this to say: 
Even had decedent looked to see if there "'as an 
automobile approaching, this "\Yould not haYP ex-
onerated him from negligence. As long as he 
"\Yalked directly into the course of an approaching 
automobile without taking any precaution for his 
safety, it would make no difference 'vhethcr he 
looked or failed to look for approaching traffic. If 
he looked and inattenti,-ely failed to see the ap-
proaching car or absentmindedly failed to realize 
his danger, or should realize his danger but still 
continued on into the course of the car he ,,-ould 
be in the same situation as to contributory neg-
ligence as though he failed to look at all. 
The Mingu-s case has been cited for the proposi-
tion that one undertaking to cross a street in a cross 
walk and with the right of way must initially make an 
observation for traffic before proceeding across the 
road,vay and if this is not done he ""'ill be guilty of neg-
ligence as a matter of la,v. Ho,veYer, that the case 
also stands for the proposition that such a man must 
maintain a proper lookout as he crosses the street by 
making continuing reappraisals and gauging his actions 
accordingly is born out by the quotations giYen above. 
In the instant case plaintiff "\vas not faced 'vith the 
problem of multiple appraisement as the Court indi-
cates ~[rs. Coombs 'vas in Coo1nbs Y. Perry, but her sit-
uation is more analogous to that of l\Ir. l\[ingus be-
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<·ause thPy "·ere both faced 'vith a ~ingle appraisement 
situat io11, i.P., there was only one object creating a haz-
ard to then1 and that is the only thing they had to \vatch 
at that time to keep themselves from injury. However, 
t hPrP is one difference in the latter case and that is that 
~lr. ~lingu~, whose back was to the hazardous traffic, 
had to look back over his left shoulder to observe traf-
fic and act accordingly, \vhile plaintiff herein merely 
had to watch where she was going and she could have 
seen defendant's automobile, constantly have re-ap-
praised her situation without any inconvenience or 
hazard to herself and gauged her conduct accordingly. 
It is inconceivable that defendant's automobile 
\vith its left turn signal light flashing, proceeding into 
the intersection in the process of making its turn would 
not have been seen by plaintiff who was looking almost 
directly down the street and across the intersection 
to\vard it, as plaintiff would haYe looked due to the 
angle of her vision by reason of the direction of her 
travel and that of defendant. It follows, that either 
plaintiff did not look, as she said she did, or if she 
looked, she did not see ""hat was there plainly to be seen. 
Her failure in either respect ""as negligent. 
POINT II 
THE TRlA_L COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY _A_T THE TRIAL 
OF THE "JLA.TTER IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
DEFE~D ... \XT'S REQliESTED INSTRUC-
TIOX XO. 4. 
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Defendant has filed a cross appeal in this matter 
and Point I of his Statement of Points on Cross Ap-
peal will be considered in his brief as Point II. 
Instruction No. 4 of defendant's requested instruc-
tions is as follows : 
You are instructed that the plaintiff, Loene X el-
son, \vas guilty of negligence as a matter of la .. w, 
and the only question for you to determine is 
\vhether or not this negligence was a proximate 
or contributing cause of the accident \Yhich 
occurred. 
If you find that it \vas such a cause, you should re-
turn a verdict of no cause of action. If you find 
it \Vas not such a cause, and you further find that 
the defendant, Earl LeRoy Hutchings, \Vas negli-
gent, which negligence was a proximate cause of 
the accident, you should then consider the dam-
ages to be a\varded to plaintiff. 
The trial judge refused to g1ve the instruction to 
the JUry. 
Instructions 1n an action are to be regarded as a 
connected series and if considered as a \vhole they 
fairly present the issues to the jury and state the gov-
erning la,v, error in individual instructions may be dis-
regarded as harmless. Start in r. ]fads en, 120 Utah 
631, 237 P. 2d 834. Error in regard to instructions ''Till 
not be held reversible unless it results in prejudice to 
appellant by injuriously affecting his material or sub-
stantiYc rights. I)rudential Insura/Yl·ce Cornpany v. Fos-
ter, 197 Okla. 39, 168 P. 2d 295, 166 .A.LR 1, Peck r. GHber, 
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1:)-1- ( >r. 126, .>9 P. 2d 67:>, 106 .. AI. .. R 996. However, error 
generally rPsults from instrnetions ""hich tend to mislead 
the jury so that thPy reach a different result than they 
\Vould havP rraehed but for the error, 5 Am. ,Jur. 2d, Ap-
pPal und Error, § 810, and in such a case the verdict 
should he sPt aside or the matter re-tried and the jury 
properly instructed . 
. As to thr contributory negligence of plaintiff, cross-
appellant adopts and includes under Point II by refer-
PllCP, the argument and authorities cited and discussed 
in Point I of this brief, and urges upon the Court that 
the negligence of plaintiff is manifest. It is the conten-
tion of cross-appellant that the trial court should have 
instructed thr jury that plaintiff was negligent in her 
ronduct and, as a matter of law, should have taken from 
thP jury consideration of that aspect of the case. Whether 
or not plaintiff's conduct proximately contributed to the 
accident and its resulting injury should have been given 
to them to consider. 
The case of Langlois v. Rees, 10 Utah 2d 272, 351 P. 
~d 638 (1960) \Yas an automobile pedestrian accident 
w·hich occurred on a street at a place other than a cross-
\\·alk. .A. t the trial, the lo\ver court instructed the jury 
that the plaintiff pedestrian \\"as guilty of negligence as 
a matter of law for her conduct in crossing the street 
\vhere she did but it left the question of causation for the 
jury's consideration. On appeal, the Supreme Court held 
that to be proper in that case. Cross appellant feels that 
plaintiff's conduct in the instant case \vas as obviously 
negligent as was that of the pedestrian in Langlois v. 
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Rees and that the question of negligence and causation 
should have been handled in the same "'"ay. 
It is urged by cross appellant that the trial court's 
failure to instruct the jury that plaintiff was negligent 
and to leave causation for their consideration was error 
for the following reasons: (1) If plaintiff "'"as, in fact, 
negligent as cross appellant asserts, then the Court gave 
an unnecessary and misleading instruction to the jury 
when it instructed them to consider the question of her 
negligence. Since negligence and causation ,,,.ere directed 
against defendant, the fact that the Court permitted 
the jury to consider the question of plaintiff's negligence 
created an inference that plaintiff "'"as not or may not 
have been negligent and this merely cluttered the issues 
and confused the jury, (2) if plaintiff 'Yas in fact negli-: 
gent, then the jury had no right to consider the question, 
( 3) if plaintiff 'vas negligent as a matter of la"'"' and the 
question of her negligence 'vas given to the jury for de-
termination, they could and may erroneously haYe found 
that plaintiff "ras not negligent at the time and plaee of 
the accident, and if they erroneously found that plaintiff 
was not negligent, then they would not have considered 
the question of causation, nor would they haYe been re-
quired to do so since the Court had directed negligence 
and causation against defendant. Hence, the one impor-
tant question that the jur~r should consider would be the 
one question that they would not consider, causing them 
to reach a different result than they "'"ould have rea.ehed 
except for the error by the Court in not having instructed 
them properly. 
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rrhis being the rase, permitting the jury verdict to 
~tand "·otlld be injurious to defendant affecting his ma-
terial and substantive rights. 
To prevent a miscarriage of justice the jury verdict 
should be set aside or the matter re-tried with the jury 
properly instructed the second time to assist them in 
their duties. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the facts as revealed in the record 
and the law as discussed herein, the negligence of plain-
tiff is amply demonstrated and the action of the trial 
court in granting defendant's motion for judgment not-
'vithstanding the verdict wholly justified. The judgment 
of the lower court should remain undisturbed and in no 
event should the jury verdict be reinstated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
I\:IPP AND CHARLIER 
D. GARY CHRISTIAN, Esq. 
516 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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